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1. Introduction.  Origin and purpose of ET∗ 
1.1. Protecting  the  tax  borders  beyond  the  scope  of  de  jure  transfers  of 
assets  and  companies.  The  principles  of  territoriality,  benefit  and 
ability‐to‐pay 
In today’s modern states, income taxes 1  are undoubtedly the main tool for 
redistribution of income among citizens. In order to really be redistributive, they 
must lie on foundations of equity and fairness2, ie., they must identify and target 
situations where real income arises, while being based on criteria common to all 
taxpayers.  In effect, states under the rule of law are required by their citizens not 
only to define, but also, and principally, to legitimize tax policy choices, such as 
personal and objective scope, territorial reach, and also the relevant chargeable income 
manifestations.  
                                                 
∗ Right after this dissertation was finished, the Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott in Case C- 
371/10 National Grid Indus was published.  Its main conclusions do not differ much from those 
that are anticipated in chapter 6, namely as regards the imposition of a deferral of ET to ensure 
proportionality and the ancillary obligations thereon, but we dissent in regard to some positions 
taken by the AG, such as accepting coherence as a justification (see para.97) or endorsing an 
indefinite ET deferral.  We also cover issues which are not dealt with in the AG’s Opinion.  No 
change has been made to this work following such Opinion. 
1 Where not expressed otherwise, the references to “income taxes” include capital gains taxation. 
2 Roy Rohatgi (Basic International Taxation: Principles of International Taxation, 2005, 2nd Ed Richmond Law 
& Tax Ltd 23) refers to horizontal equity, requiring equal taxation on equal income, ie., an ability-to-pay, and 
to vertical equity, which expresses the need to tax progressively higher those who earn income above 
certain levels.  See, also on this subject, Adam Zalasinski, ‘The limits of the EC concept of ‘Direct Tax 
Restriction on Free Movement Rights’, The Principles of Equality and Ability to Pay and the Interstate 
Fiscal Equity’ (2009) 37 5 Intertax 292. 
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The interaction of such national tax policies has led to the emergence of what 
some authors call the “international tax regime”3. Even those who hold that a 
true ‘regime’ requires coercion - which is not currently in place - will not find it hard 
to acknowledge that in today’s international tax arena principles like non-
discrimination, the arm’s length standard and the avoidance of double taxation4, are almost 
like a pre-condition to a state’s entry into the developed world. Jurisdiction to tax 
cross-border income flows or gains is, hence, not limitless; on the contrary, it is 
understood that fiscal jurisdiction essentially stems from two main connecting 
factors, residence and source5, and from three basic principles: territoriality, ability-to-
pay and benefit. In its tax shape, territoriality is not more than an emanation of an 
international public law principle with the same name which confines countries’ 
jurisdictions to their own borders.  Its EU relevance has been many times 
acknowledged by the CJ, as in Marks and Spencer6: “In accordance with the principle of 
territoriality, applicable both in international law and Community law, the MS in which the 
parent company is established has no tax jurisdiction over non-resident subsidiaries”.  
                                                 
3 Reuven Avi-Yonah (‘Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime’ [2007] April 
BIT 130) sustains that there is, in fact, an international tax regime characterized by a set of principles 
“embodied both in the tax treaty network and in domestic laws and that it forms (the international tax regime) part 
of international law (both treaty based and customary)”.  
4 Idem, 132.  According to this author, international legal instruments like DTCs are the culmination of 
the international consensus on what he calls the “single tax principle”, which he sees as the universal 
paradigm for cross-border transactions. In his own words: “the single tax principle thus incorporates the 
traditional goal of avoiding double taxation, which was the main motive for setting up the international tax regime in the 
1920s and 1930s.”  
5 Wolfgang Schön, (‘International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part I)’ [2009] October 
ET 67) argues that both source and residence are being wore down by the corporate and personal 
mobility brought about by globalization, stating in particular that “the factual basis for the identification 
of corporate residence is gradually eroding” (p. 69). However, if an international tax regime indeed 
exists, allocation of source and of residence still appears to be the only route to ascribe tax jurisdiction, 
outside the domain of arguably extra-territorial anti-abuse mechanisms as CFC rules.  
6  C- 446/03, para. 36. 
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However, even though aiming to circumscribe the state’s power to tax, this 
principle offers no clues on how much income should be taxed and when taxation 
may take place.   
In general, both these issues are dealt with in the light of the other two principles, 
which steer the states’ income tax policy options. The ability-to-pay principle, as 
noted by Schön 7 , is an expression of the “solidarity among members of a 
society”, and lies at the very heart of the social contract. States have come up with 
concepts like nationality and residence as decisive factors to impose tax on a person’s 
worldwide income – that is, on a person’s whole ability-to-pay - irrespective of their 
origin.  Source location, however, appears to be largely irrelevant from the ability-
to-pay standpoint, because purchasing capacity may derive from the state of 
residence, nationality or elsewhere8.  Differently, the effective realization of income 
and the ensuing purchasing capacity is the cornerstone of the ability-to-pay 
philosophy, especially in a time when borrowing for purchasing capacity based on 
potential income or gains has seen better days. 
The significance of source originates on the principle of benefit. It is understood 
that the countries where the payer or the subsidiary are domiciled have a claim to 
tax the interest, or the dividend because they provide the conditions for the 
income to arise.  Ideally, for source countries there should be a direct proportion 
between the benefits they provide locally – from infrastructure to the purchasing 
power and/or productive capacity of their inhabitants - and the amount of tax 
they charge for income obtained in their territory.  But benefit and ability-to-pay are 
                                                 
7  Op. cit., p.71. 
8 The link between residence and taxing on ability-to-pay basis must be viewed cum grano sallis in an EU 
setting, following the Schumacker jurisprudence (Case C-279/93). The country of residence of Mr. 
Schumacker, Belgium, as he earned almost no income from Belgian sources, could not tax him under 
the ability-to-pay principle, and, thus, allow him to benefit from personal deductions and allowances. As 
a result of the fact that he earned almost the totality of his income in Germany, the CJ held that he had 
to be treated as a German resident, despite is internal non-resident legal status.  
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by no means opposite concepts: the quantity of benefits provided by a State should 
play a part in legitimizing taxation based on the ability-to-pay, and, thus, on 
residence, but the idea that benefit alone – which is very difficult to measure – 
should be the sole motivation for source taxation fails to adhere to economic 
reality9, especially when there are substantial benefits provided by countries other 
than the source country. 
As obvious as it may be, the context we have just outlined is, nonetheless, 
essential to understanding the motivations and the boundaries of ET, especially 
in the EU, where the protection ensured to the mobility of residents and 
nationals of the MSs by the fundamental freedoms, namely the FoE, is a clear 
obstacle to their taxing prerogatives.  Though exit taxes may fall upon persons as 
well as corporate bodies and PEs, we will mainly focus on ET of the latter group, 
an area where, as we will see, there is currently more uncertainty and complexity.  
Our main priority will be, on a different note from much of the work in this area 
we have come across10, to analyze ET from a principled perspective, with a view 
                                                 
9 The mutability of all these concepts and principles is quite manifest in the taxation of PEs.  From an 
ability-to-pay and tax status perspective, PEs are comparable to resident companies and, in general, are 
subject to the same tax rules.  At an international level, OECD-based Conventions ensure, via non-
discrimination provisions (OECD Model Convention, article 24), that PEs are treated in the same way 
as companies, and, at an EU level, such identity of tax status is preserved by the freedom of 
establishment, as upheld by the CJ in C-307/97 Saint Gobain and C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland.  
10 Many authors have published works on ET in EU and EEA states like Germany [Schneeweiss (ET 
after Cartesio: The European Fundamental Freedom’s Impact on Taxing Migrating Companies (2009) 37 6/7 
Intertax 363), Seitz (Notional Income from the Cross-Border Internal Transfer of Assets – Why the Amendments to 
the German Income Tax Act Violate the Freedom of Establishment (2008) 36 2 Intertax 44), Fuhrich (ET and 
ECJ Case Law [2008]) ET 10, Daiber and Offermans (What’s Going On In… Germany: German Exit Tax 
Provisions, Substantial Shareholdings and Incompatibility with EC Law’[2005] ET 579) France [Kotanidis 
(What’s Going On In… European Union: French Exit Tax Incompatible with the Freedom of Establishment: Case C-
9/02 (2004) ET 375)], The Netherlands [Weber (European Union: Exit Taxes on the Transfer of Seat and the 
Applicability of the Freedom of Establishment after Überseering [2003] ET 350), Van den Hurk and Korving (The 
ECJ’s Judgement in the N Case against the Netherlands and its Consequences for Exit Taxes in the European Union 
S1007 
 
6 
 
 
to ascertaining whether it can coexist with the EU freedoms and also with the 
relevant international tax principles. We will not dedicate much time to discussing 
whether national company laws can prevent company emigration (as discussed in 
cases like Daily Mail11, Uberseering12 or Cartesio13) but rather assume that in some 
countries (eg., Portugal14) such emigration is allowed, that in the same or other 
countries the subsequent immigration is also allowed (eg. in Luxembourg), and, 
finally, that European Companies (SEs) are, under certain conditions, free to 
migrate within the EU. 
1.2. ET in light of the principles of international income taxation 
In general, ET aims at levying the potential or latent gains (also called “hidden 
reserves”) related with the assets that an individual, a company or a PE located in 
a given country, economically (eg., through allocation to a foreign PE of a 
                                                                                                                                        
[2007] BIT 150]. Other authors like O’Shea [Cartesio: Moving a Company’s Seat Now Easier in the EU (2009) 
March 23 TNI 1072] Panayi [Corporate Mobility in the European Union and Exit Taxes (2009) BIT 459] 
Szudoczki [How does the European Court of Justice Treat Precedents in its Case Law? Cartesio and Damseaux from a 
Different Perspective: Part I (2009) 37 6/7 Intertax 346], Gusmeroli [The Conversion of a Branch into a 
Subsidiary under the EC Merger Directive: Still “Rarely Pure and Never Simple (2009) ET 567] and Cerioni, 
[Cross-Border Mobility of Companies in the European Union: Tax Competition and Increased Scope for the CCCTB 
following Cartesio (2010) BIT 636] have mainly focused on the company law issues regarding the migration 
of companies and their impact on exit taxes. Finally, some articles by authors like Rivolta [Transfer of 
Residence within the European Union: The Treatment of Pre-Existing Losses – Part 1 (2010) 50 IBFD], have dealt 
with some specific aspects of ET like the treatment of pre-recorded losses. 
11 C-81/87. 
12 C-208/00. 
13 C-210/06. 
14 For an accurate analysis on the wide possibilities offered by Portuguese Company law for company 
emigration and immigration, see Karsten Sorensen, Mette Neville, ‘Corporate Migration in the 
European Union’ (2000) 6 Columbia Journal of European Law 181. 
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trademark or a shareholding), or physically transfer to another tax jurisdiction15. A 
first feature of ET is, thus, related with the fact that it is imposed when no asset 
disposal takes place, and no revenue is generated. At the outset, this leaves much 
room for uncertainty vis-à-vis the ability-to-pay: the taxpayer may not be solvent 
enough 16  and even if he is, he is put in a disadvantageous situation when 
compared with (i) a person17 that has really disposed of similar assets, with the 
ensuing revenue, and (ii) a non-migrant person with the same unrealized gains. 
So, the potential for discrimination or restriction in this field is considerable. That 
is even more so when the migrating assets are ultimately taxed in the host state at 
a rate comparable to that of the origin country and on a similar base value. 
However, from a benefit standpoint, States imposing ET may claim that, since they 
provided to the migrant person the same benefits available to the non-migrant their 
right to a payback in the form of a tax similar to that which would be charged in 
the case of a disposal of the relevant assets is undeniable.  
A first conclusion can, then, be drawn at this stage: ET may arguably be justified 
not as a way to treat similarly taxpayers who are in similar conditions to pay tax 
(equal ability-to-pay), but as a way to give a similar treatment to taxpayers who 
benefited from similar conditions provided by the State (equal benefit). This 
appears evident, as the migrant person may suffer the same or heavier tax burden 
on gains realized in the host country, or realize gains lower than those appraised 
at the time of emigration, and the origin state may take none of these 
                                                 
15 As we will see, some states have confined ET to transfers of corporate residence and local PEs of 
foreign entities (Portugal, for instance) while other states adopt a broader spectrum by imposing exit 
taxes on virtually all outward transfers of assets within the same entity (Germany and Norway). 
16 Herman Schneeweiss (op. cit..,363), accurately refers to “liquidity constraints”. 
17  Where not expressed otherwise, the references to “persons” encompass both natural and legal 
persons. 
S1007 
 
8 
 
 
circumstances into account18. Even in this last case, one may discuss whether it 
makes sense to draw, on an ability-to-pay basis, a parallel between a person 
staying under one country’s jurisdiction and another leaving it without triggering 
no actual income manifestation. 
The second feature of ET is its temporal and quantitative disparity in relation the 
actual realization of the underlying potential income.  It may so happen that after 
emigration, a company’s assets, which had potential gains of € 1M, and suffered 
ET of m€ 300, devalue steadily for three years and are sold at a loss in the host 
country. The way this devaluation is taken into account in the origin country, 
should also come into play when we examine the compatibility of ET with the 
aforesaid principles.  A possible consideration of the time differences in terms of 
tax in the origin state seems to derive from a concern by this state to mitigate the 
blow to the ability-to-pay principle when taxation is imposed on pure potential 
gains, and underlines what has been said about the principle of benefit as being the 
main foundation of ET, principles-wise.  
If we come down to the concrete provisions of international tax law, namely to 
DTCs, we may also find that ET is not neutral in terms of the actual allocation of 
the taxing powers19 normally established thereby20. Take for instance, a company 
                                                 
18 Zalasinski (op. cit., p. 292) sees that “using a combination of real and fictitious factors for determining 
a taxpayer’s tax ability may serve two main purposes: to respect the principle of ability to pay and also to 
facilitate other, usually policy, reasons”.  As regards the fictitious gains targeted by ET we consider, as 
expanded further ahead, that ET fundamentally serves those other policy reasons, namely, on a more 
pragmatic level, the protection of tax revenues and also, on the level of principles, the retribution of the 
benefits provided by the origin country.   
19 See, in regard to DTCs, C-336/96 Gilly. 
20 This problem is addressed by Van Den Hurk (op. cit, p. 154).  This author raises the issue of the 
compatibility with the tax treaties entered into by The Netherlands of the taxation of fictitious transfers. 
He claims that, having been granted to one of the states or to both states but with limitation, tax 
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in the Source State (S) that decides to transfer its domicile to the Residence State 
(R) and possesses movable assets which are transferred from the former state to 
the latter.  State S’ internal tax law provides for ET of the potential gains on those 
assets and the emigration is allowed as per company law. The two countries have 
a DTC in force which follows closely the OECDMC. Article 13 provides no 
solution to this case, as there is no pre-existing company resident of R holding 
assets in S. On the other hand, the taxable event is simultaneous to the change of 
tax residence. As a result, the issue of allocation of taxing rights between the two 
countries does not seem to arise under the DTC provisions.  
However, there is no doubt that a problem of double taxation may emerge, 
especially when the tax base value of the assets transferred is lower in R than its 
deemed value in S.  It can be assumed, though, that except where there is goodwill, 
the result deriving from the mentioned company emigration is equal to that 
which would originate from the sale of the movable assets that another company 
already resident in R would have in S, provided those assets did not form a PE in 
S.  In this last case, no taxation would be due in State S even in the case of an 
effective alienation of the assets, let alone in the event of a fictitious one21 .  
Therefore, it is fair to ask whether an interpretation in good faith of the DTC 
would not determine the same treatment of both situations, especially if we 
consider that in the case at issue no “real” gain is obtained. Some prominent 
scholars 22  sustain that no provision in the OECDMC, including its 
Commentaries, disallows the inclusion of the taxation of fictitious income, like 
ET, in the “other income” article (21), which allocates full taxation to the country 
                                                                                                                                        
jurisdiction cannot be changed by way of purchases or alienations that did not occur.  This may amount 
to an infringement of the tax treaty and of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
21 The solution would not be alike if the assets sold were held by a PE of R in S. See Commentary to 
article 7 of the OECDMC (2010), para. 21. 
22 See Peter Wattel, Otto Marres, ‘Characterization of Fictitious Income under OECD-Patterned Tax 
Treaties’ (2003) March ET 66. 
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of residence.  For the reasons already pointed out, we follow this reasoning, 
which results from a purposive interpretation of the OECDMC.  As a result, 
whenever the actual transfer of residence is the tax triggering event, it can be 
argued that residence should be ascribed to the host country, with the consequent 
application of article 13 or article 21, which block source taxation23, except where 
there is an asset alienation by a PE in the source state.  
2. Relevant analogies and differences between various  forms of  cross‐
border migrations of companies and assets  
2.1. Transfers of legal seat or place of effective management  
In general, levying a transfer of assets requires their effective disposal or, at least, 
a transfer of a right in rem against a payment or an obligation to pay.   This will not 
happen with the mere transfer of the legal seat or place of management, unless 
the origin state attaches to such a transfer the wind-up and/or liquidation of the 
company, as a consequence, for instance, of an ensuing loss of nationality. In this 
event, the transfer of the assets to the shareholders upon liquidation entails a 
change of ownership on which a gain or a loss is triggered. Absent such event, 
the imposition of ET originates on an exceptional taxable fact, which, in most 
cases, represents an enlargement of the normal tax base. That is to say, as opposed 
to the general rule of income realization24 following a disposal, ET will usually 
assume one of two legal characters: 
                                                 
23 Wattel/Marres raise this issue of the triggering event in ET, urging the OECD to include a provision 
on fictitious income in the Model (Ibidem, 79). 
24 In accounting, the fair value paradigm has largely replaced realization. IAS 16 (Tangible Assets), 38 
(Intangible Assets) and 39 (Financial Instruments: recognition and measurement), foresee, as a general 
principle, that when the fair value of a tangible, intangible asset or financial asset can be measured 
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i. A special taxable fact in its own right; 
ii. A legal fiction of a disposal of assets. 
This distinction, although apparently superfluous, may be relevant, eg., in the 
interpretation of the scope of ET25. Differently, the origin state may prescribe 
that ET on migration is deferred if the migrant’s assets remain wholly connected 
to a PE in that State.  If, in such a case, the origin state taxes such PE on the 
basis of the profits attributable to it (and not just those that arise in the origin 
state), its jurisdiction to tax the gains accumulated up to exit may remain 
unaffected, provided the assets thereof keep their value. 
2.2. Mergers, divisions and asset transfers 
Business reorganizations tend to assume the legal status of mergers, divisions or 
asset transfers when the consideration of the business(es) transferred thereby are 
shares of the company(ies) acquiring them. 
In the EU context, mergers are operations whereby one or more companies (the 
“transferring company(ies)”) transfer all their assets and liabilities to an already 
existing company or to a company set up for the purpose (the “receiving 
company”) 26 . The loss that the shareholders record upon extinction of their 
shares of the transferring company is balanced by a share subscription of the 
receiving company.  A division takes place whenever a company transfers of one 
                                                                                                                                        
reliably, it should be booked accordingly. For an in-depth study on tax and fair value, see Tomás 
Tavares (IRC e Contabilidade - Da Realização ao Justo Valor, [Almedina 2011]). 
25 For example, the prevailing hermeneutical principles in a certain jurisdiction may determine that 
where taxation is based on a legal fiction, its scope is to be interpreted restrictively.  This may be 
relevant, for example, to ascertain to what extent should the tax measurement of the potential gains or 
losses upon exit follow the guidelines applicable to disposals of assets between related entities, ie., if 
transfer pricing rules also cover company migrations.   
26 See article 2, Council Directive 1990/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 (‘Merger Directive’). 
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if its branches of activity to one or more existing companies (partial division) or 
to a new company (also a partial division) or, it is totally divided into one or more 
parts forming two or more companies (total division). Finally, asset transfers 
resemble partial divisions, with the difference that the shares received as 
consideration for the transfer of the branch of activity are received by the 
transferor and not by its shareholders. 
In all these operations, the ownership of the assets being transferred changes 
hands, from the transferring company to the receiving company. Under most, if 
not all of the EU jurisdictions, absent the harmonized neutrality regime27, they 
will typically give rise to taxation on the difference between the arm’s length value 
of the assets (or the face value of the shares subscribed plus, subject to a cap, a 
possible cash amount) and their acquisition cost (less possible depreciation or 
amortization, and inflation coefficient adjustment). Seen from an ability-to-pay 
viewpoint, these operations cause the potential gain underlying the assets to 
become effective and, as a rule, will produce revenue, for accounting purposes28.  
Therefore, they are intrinsically different from the operations focused in 2.1. 
above; because they involve a legal transmission, their tax relevance will not 
typically depend on any territorial factor, given that taxation will arise irrespective 
of where the assets transferred are located. Nonetheless, on an EU cross-border 
scenario, reorganizations are protected from the underlying gains on the asset 
transfers they entail via three distinct mechanisms29: 
                                                 
27  Despite the obligation to apply the Merger Directive neutrality regime to cross-border 
reorganizations, a reverse discrimination of purely internal operations, although implausible, would not 
infringe EU Law. In this respect, see C-513/03 Van Hilten. 
28 See IAS 18 “Revenue”. 
29 For a detailed analysis on the subject see Guglielmo Maisto, ‘Shaping EU Company Tax Policy: 
Amending the Tax Directives’ [2002] ET 287, Russo R., Offermanns R., ‘European Union: The 2005 
Amendments to the EC Merger Directive’ [2006] ET 250. 
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i. Carry-over of the tax values of the transferred assets and liabilities (a concept 
defined in article 4 (1) (a) of the Merger Directive) by the receiving company 
until disposal; 
ii. Carry-over, by the shareholders the transferring company, of the tax value of 
the shares which are exchanged by shares of the receiving company (article 
8); 
iii. Effective connection of any assets transferred, to a PE of the receiving 
company in the Member State of the transferring company (or, in the case of 
a migrating SE, of a PE in the origin state) liable to tax in the latter state 
(article 10b). 
2.3. Cross‐border transfers of assets within the same entity  
Internal transfers between PE and head-office or between PEs will not give rise, 
by definition, to a change of title of the assets transferred either internally or 
cross-border. Being, by and large, an economic concept, a PE is not legally 
autonomous from the head-office or another PE of the same entity.  However, 
sometimes a PE in the origin state may be deemed to be an independent person 
in the host state or vice-versa. That may be the case when, for example, a 
Portuguese company transfers assets to an UK-based partnership as its 
contribution as a member. A partnership will typically not be recognized in 
Portugal as an independent person, but that may not be the case in the UK with, 
for instance, an LLP (limited liability partnership).  The inverse situation is equally 
possible.  This conflict of qualification may have significant consequences in the 
case of ET imposed on assets transferred as a contribution to a partnership 
formed in the host state, where this state does not recognize such partnership as 
being independent from its partners.  In particular, if the origin state taxes the 
hidden reserves upon exit of the assets, it is likely that if the partnership is 
deemed to have a PE in the host state, this state will not consider as tax base 
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value on a subsequent transfer the arm’s length amount taken into account in the 
prior computation of the ET.   
3. The  Portuguese  ET  regime  and  some  features  of  the  sophisticated 
Norwegian and German ET regimes.  
3.1. Portugal  
Portuguese corporate ET rules were first enacted in 2006, following the 
publication of Law 60-A/2005, of 30 December (Portuguese State Budget for 
2006), which introduced the current articles 83 to 85 of the Portuguese Corporate 
Tax Code (‘IRC’).  Exit taxes are covered at three different levels: (i) article 83 is 
directed at the corporate migrations (transfers of tax residence) by a company 
domiciled in Portugal, including a Societas Europaea30 (‘SE’) or a Societas Cooperativa 
Europaea31 (‘SCE’), (ii) article 84 covers ET of a Portuguese PE of a non-resident 
company and, finally, (iii) article 85 deals with the taxation of the shareholders of 
a migrating company as per article 83.  A common feature of the three provisions 
is that not only latent gains are liable to IRC upon exit, but also any potential 
losses are taken into account for the computation of the exit result.   
Corporate migrations 
Firstly, under article 83 IRC32, ET will only be due on a change of both of the 
relevant IRC residence connecting factors33: place of the legal seat and of effective 
                                                 
30 See Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 (‘RegSE’). 
31 See Council Regulation (EC) 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003. 
32 From here onwards, references to any pieces of law will contain the number of the respective article 
plus the abbreviation thereof (eg. 67 IRC). 
33 See, 2 (3) IRC. 
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management34.  The measurement of the tax quantum is done by subtracting to the 
market value of the asset elements35 their accounting value deemed relevant for 
tax purposes.  In the author’s opinion, this explicit rule shows that the Legislature 
is perfectly aware that a corporate migration cannot be viewed as a transaction 
between ‘related entities’ under the Portuguese IRC transfer pricing rule (62 IRC), 
even when the migrant company allocates its assets totally or partially to a 
Portuguese PE36.  Otherwise, it would have simply referred to the arm’s length 
value definition contained in 62 IRC.  
However, insofar as the assets of the migrant entity remain connected to a PE 
situated in Portuguese territory and exposed to IRC (eg. not benefiting from an 
exclusion or tax exemption), no liability to tax will arise, provided the tax 
valuation of the relevant assets is done in accordance with the IRC neutrality 
regime for cross-border reorganizations, which follows very closely the Merger 
Directive. A first paradox of this regime is that a migrant entity may, indeed, 
become worse off than it was prior to the migration, in terms of its Portuguese 
tax position. That outcome is made possible by the circumstance that, despite 
maintaining full tax jurisdiction over all the assets of the migrant entity, 
Portuguese law may not treat the PE in the same way as a resident corporate 
body37. Furthermore, as noted by Ricardo Borges and Pedro Ribeiro de Sousa in 
the most detailed study on Portuguese cross-border business restructurings 
                                                 
34 The change of the legal seat or of the place of effective management causes an automatic cessation of 
activities under 8 (5) (a) IRC. 
35 Free translation of the Portuguese wording “elementos patrimoniais”. 
36 63 (9) IRC deems as transactions between related entities any operations between a non-resident 
entity and its Portuguese PE and between the latter and other foreign PEs of the former.  
37 However, it is noteworthy that this prima facie less favorable treatment infringes free establishment, as 
seen in Saint-Gobain and Royal Bank of Scotland, or may infringe, on an international level, the rule of PE 
non-discrimination [OECDMC, article 24 (3)]. 
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available38, this regime does not take into account “any asset devaluation after tax 
emigration of the Portuguese company”, in stark contrast to the immediate taxation of 
all potential gains39.  Furthermore, the same rule does not provide for special 
relief when assets previously taxed upon migration of the company are eventually 
sold, for instance, through a PE set up by the Portuguese PE in another country, 
thus generating gains taxable in both countries. In this case, a mismatch in the 
relevant tax base values attached to those assets may give rise to double taxation40.   
This lack of balance of the regime and the hardship of the alternative to the 
immediate taxation of the hidden reserves – eg., the connection of all assets to a 
Portuguese PE – will be examined further ahead, but, prima facie, it can be said 
that this regime is far from ensuring that corporate migrations are not restrained 
by tax reasons. 
Asset transfers from Portuguese PEs of non‐resident companies 
This other type of ET (article 84 CIRC), where no change in the residence 
connecting factor occurs, comprises solely two types of exit situations, although 
only one of them can be truly classified as an “exit”.  
A first instance of taxation will take place when the PE of a non-resident entity 
ceases its activity.  The intention here is obvious: when the assets no longer form 
                                                 
38 See ‘Cross-Border Business Restructurings: Portuguese Branch Report’ (2011) IFA Cahiers 621. 
39 Borges and Sousa reckon that the regime does not provide for a deferral of tax until the hidden 
reserves are realized in clear infringement of the CJ’s dicta in C-470/04 N and C-9/02 Lasteyrie du 
Saillant.  This assumption is not entirely correct in relation to IRC ET, as such deferral is guaranteed 
where a PE-connection of the migrant entity’s assets is kept, but is accurate in relation to the special ET 
on individuals under article 10(9) of the Personal Income Tax (‘IRS’) Code. 
40  If both countries involved are bound by a tax treaty and agree to follow the wording and 
Commentaries of the OECD Model 2010 version it is likely that, by virtue of the recognition of the 
arm’s length character of the transactions between PE and head office, the base value in the host state 
should, more or less, correspond to the exit value in the origin state, as per article 7 (2). 
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part of a PE, any capital gains on a subsequent disposal thereof will escape 
Portuguese tax jurisdiction if Portugal and the state where the head office is 
situated have signed a DTC41; it is a way to tackle possible abuse by neutralizing 
the tax effect that would derive from an indirect sale of the PE via its cessation 
followed by a sale of all its assets.  It follows that the assets may physically stay in 
Portugal, but will be taxed when the PE is dismantled. This corresponds to a 
double fiction: the fiction of a sale fiction (the “exit”).  ET will also be levied on 
outward transfers of assets attributable to the PE, by any means (legal and/or 
material).  Here, the assets transferred lose their territorial connection with 
Portugal and, so, escape its tax jurisdiction.  Borges and Sousa42 share a particular 
view in regard to this provision with which we do not agree. They hold that 
article 84(2) IRC aims at taxing “isolated transfers of assets that are not already covered by 
the transfer pricing rule of article 63(9) of the IRC Code”43, namely partial winding-ups of 
businesses (not included in 84(1)) or terminations of use of part of the PE’s 
assets.  Otherwise, the authors claim, there would be an overlap between the two 
provisions.   
First of all, neither the wording of article 84(2), nor the systematic insertion of 
article 63(9), point to this interpretation.  Article 84(2) refers to “transfers of 
elements” and omits any specific mention to “certain” assets or functions.  
Secondly, article 63(9) is not a rule on tax incidence or recognition but only on tax 
measurement, which applies the arm’s length principle to transactions that are, 
beforehand, recognized for IRC purposes.  The rule for tax recognition in the IRC is 
still that of realization (See Articles 21 (1) (h)), ie., potential gains, such as those 
underlying assets transferred outwards within the same company are only taxed 
on a subsequent realization. That is the case, for instance, of assets held by a 
                                                 
41 See article 14 (5) OECDMC.  
42 Op. Cit., p.611. 
43 This rule applies the arm’s length principle to transfers between a Portuguese PE of a non-resident 
entity or between other non-resident PEs of the same entity. 
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Portuguese company which are transferred to a PE situated abroad.  Article 63(9) 
is no exception to the rule of realization, but article 84(2) IRC clearly is, no 
“deemed sale” taking place under the former but only under the latter. 
However, if this is so, does article 63(9) IRC still have a function?  It certainly 
does. Before the entry into force of article 84(2) IRC, it ensured that, where no 
CDT applied or where articles 13(2) and 7(2) of the Portuguese OECD-type 
CDTs did apply, Portugal would keep exclusive jurisdiction to tax, on an eventual 
sale of the asset previously transferred outwards within the same company or in 
other internal operations between the Portuguese PE and the head office or other 
PEs (e.g., notional loans or industrial property licensing) the part of the realized 
gain corresponding to an arm’s length value of the assets at the time of the prior 
exit, irrespective of the relevant tax value in the head office state or of those 
other PEs.  While it is clear that, after the entry into force of Article 84(2), the 
scope of article 63(9) has been narrowed, it is not less evident that this provision 
still ensures the domestic application of the arm’s length principle to those 
notional intra-company operations.  Therefore, the mentioned overlap between the 
two provisions, being merely partial, is the obvious outcome of a more recent tax 
policy guideline to ensure not only an arm’s length tax base in Portugal, but also 
the effectiveness in the tax collection achieved through ET.  This solution is 
coherent with the previously commented benefit approach to the issue of ET. 
Taxation of the shareholders 
In addition to taxing the migrant companies or PEs, article 85 IRC also levies 
shareholders, on the difference between the market value of the shares of the 
migrant company and its acquisition cost.  If the shareholder is a company, the 
gain will, in most cases, be taxed as dividend, pursuant to article 85(1) IRC 
whereas if it is an individual, any gains shall be qualified either as income from 
capital or as capital gains. In the conditions set out in article 10b. of the Merger 
Directive, no tax will be due in the event the migrant company is an SE.  One 
interesting point is the fact that, from the shareholders’ standpoint, taxation will 
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occur irrespective of the size of the shareholding44, meaning that free movement 
of capital rather than FoE will be at issue in the ET of the shareholders and, thus, 
freedom protection may encompass third countries’ shareholders. 
3.2. Some  important  features of  the sophisticated Norwegian and German 
ET regimes 
Norway 
The corporate ET regime in Norway, an EEA state45, constitutes a real case-study 
on the complexity and variability of such regimes46.   
Apparently in order to avoid possible doubts on the exercise of territoriality, ET 
on a residence transfer is deemed to be triggered in the day prior that in which it 
occurs. That means that the migrant company is still a resident when the fictitious 
sale takes place. Norwegian law is silent on whether ET will apply even when the 
assets of the migrant company remain connected to a local PE; thus, the 
maintenance of a PE-connection is not an ET safe-harbour. Furthermore, no ET 
deferral is available for migrant companies, contrary to what is foreseen for 
individuals and asset transfers within the same entity.  With regard to asset 
transfers, taxation will arise as soon as the assets leave Norwegian tax jurisdiction 
even if no territorial transfer takes place47. However, assets other than intangibles 
                                                 
44 See, inter alia, C-157/05 Hölbock and Joined Cases C-436/08 and C-437/08 Haribo and Sallinen. See 
also, from the author, ‘The ECJ jurisprudence on third countries’ movement of capital rights: is a 
conspiracy in place?’ (2010) 11 EC Tax Journal 73. 
45 Though an EEA State, Norway is bound by the FoE (see article 31 EEA Agreement). 
46 See Zimmer F., ‘Exit Taxes in Norway’ [2009] WTJ 115. 
47 Curiously, as noted by Zimmer (ibidem, 139) a transfer to a state which DTC with Norway foresees 
the credit method for PE profits is deemed not to constitute an “exit”, which, in our opinion, may 
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and inventories benefit from a deferral with guarantee, and will escape ET if the 
assets are not sold within five years. In addition, a reverse credit may be available 
where the gain subject to ET is taxed twice due to the adoption of historic cost 
for the sold asset in the host state. Another curious rule taxes the latent gains on 
the assets of a CFC in a low-tax country when control by a resident company is 
lost. It is really ET in the most extreme form: a tax applied on foreign assets of a 
non-resident which do not move48.   
Germany 
The German ET system shares some of the features of the Norwegian one – eg. 
it taxes virtually all operations which entail a limitation or a loss in German tax 
jurisdiction, including company migrations and cross-border relocations of assets.  
Two peculiarities deserve special attention 49 .  First, the concept of operating 
functions, introduced in 2008, arguably the most important object of German ET.  
According to the German rules, where operating functions are transferred outwards 
or reduced, an exit charge is imposed, the value of which will correspond to the 
profit potential of the functions. Such profit potential is measured to the largest 
extent possible: it encompasses the loss in profit potential of the transferor and 
the gain in profit potential of the transferee, thus targeting totally or partially tax-
driven relocations. Second, transfers of assets (including functions, it is presumed) 
within the EU may benefit from a five-year deferral of exit tax, whereby the tax 
ends up being paid in 20% instalments in each of the five years subsequent to the 
transfer. Unlike in Norway and France (at least before de Lasteyrie), no definitive 
exclusion of tax is foreseen. 
                                                                                                                                        
support Norway’s claim of an anti-abuse purpose to the rule (if the assets are sold further ahead, the 
final tax rate on the gain will always be the Norwegian one). 
48 Ibidem, 140. 
49 Hartmut Wolter ‘Cross-border business restructuring: German Report’ (2011) 96A IFA Cahiers 349 
and Seitz, op. cit., 47. 
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4. Synopsis of the CJ jurisprudence on intra‐EU migrations of individuals 
and companies  
4.1. The tension between company migrations and company law: Daily Mail 
and Cartesio 
The CJ dealt with the issue of the compatibility with the FoE of restrictions to 
company migrations, from the origin state’s perspective, in the two widely 
debated cases Daily Mail and Cartesio.  
In Daily Mail, two UK-incorporated companies (Daily Mail and General Trust 
PLC) intended to transfer their place of central management and control from 
the UK to the Netherlands in order to benefit from a lower taxation on a 
subsequent sale of a part of their assets, which would be provided by the 
consequent change of tax residence. Under UK law, the outbound transfer of the 
management and control did not entail the loss of legal personality; however, a 
tax provision prohibited companies from ceasing to be tax residents without 
consent of the Treasury.  The Treasury denied such consent and the issue was 
referred to the CJ for a decision, among other less relevant issues, on the 
conformity of the need for a consent with the FoE.  The Court began by 
affirming that the FoE comprised the setting up of an investment management 
office in The Netherlands by a UK company.  However, it stressed that, by that 
time, companies were “creatures of national law” and national law was sovereign 
in determining how and when the loss of connection with the territory could 
generate their winding-up and liquidation, such piece of competence not being 
affected by free establishment. Thus, companies had not been conferred the right 
to retain national status in the origin state while transferring their central 
management to another jurisdiction. 
Cartesio was, in the author’s opinion, not a departure from Daily Mail, but rather a 
refined development, where the added complexity of the background allowed the 
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CJ to shed more light into the issue of company migrations. In this judgement, an 
Hungarian company, Cartesio, intended to transfer its seat to Italy while retaining 
its status as a company governed by Hungarian law.  The Hungarian authorities 
refused to register the change of seat, as that would entail the loss of national 
status, and the matter ended up being referred to the CJ. In the judgement, the 
principles in Daily Mail were reaffirmed in the sense that it was stated that 
Hungary retained the power not to allow a company therein incorporated to 
transfer its seat and still require national status. However, and this is the main 
corollary of Cartesio, free establishment did impede Hungary to require the 
winding-up of a national company in the event the same company intended to 
convert itself into a company national of another EU state which domestic 
company law provided for such conversion50.  
4.2. The individuals tax cases 
De Lasteyrie 
Upon emigration to Belgium, Mr. de Lasteyrie, a French resident, became subject 
to French income tax on hidden gains in regard to a substantial shareholding of a 
French company, and was able to defer such tax only in case he appointed a fiscal 
representative, provided a guarantee and filed annual tax declarations.  Mr. de 
Lasteyrie reacted against an assessment based on this regime and the case ended 
up being referred to the CJ on the grounds of incompatibility with the FoE.  
In its decision, the CJ reminded that the fact that the ET regime at issue allowed 
tax deferral was irrelevant to ensure FoE compliance given that such deferral had 
been made conditional to the fulfilment of administrative and financial 
requirements which were not present in internal migrations. This regime entailed 
a restriction to the FoE which could not be justified on grounds of (i) tax 
                                                 
50 See landmark paragraphs 112 and 113. 
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avoidance – as it did not exclusively target artificial arrangements -, (ii) fiscal 
coherence - it was clearly not aimed at ensuring the compensation of a tax benefit 
(no direct link), (iii) balanced allocation of taxing powers (‘BATP’) – the allocation of 
tax to France was not at stake, and (iv) loss of tax revenue - it is not an acceptable 
justification. Finally, the Court also acknowledged that the underlying 
presumption that the measure was aimed at tackling abuse was not reflected in 
the scale of the measures in question, which exceeded the necessary to achieve 
that goal.  
N  
As Cartesio did in relation to Daily Mail, N brought about a much needed 
enlightenment on some aspects of the CJ’s stance on ET. The case concerned a 
Dutch individual who emigrated to the UK in 1997 and had, at that time, the 
totality of the share capital of three Dutch companies. In the same year, the 
Dutch Tax Administration assessed exit tax on the deemed disposal, but Mr. N 
provided a security foreseen in law at the time to ensure deferment of the tax. In 
the aftermath of de Lasteyrie, the security was released by ministerial order, but Mr. 
N went to court to ask for a damage compensation and the case was referred to 
the CJ.   
The CJ began to confirm that, in such an exit, the FoE was involved, as the 
provision at issue had the potential of restricting the movement of a person who 
substantially influenced the participated company’s activities.  It then went on to 
assess whether the French tax entailed a restriction on the FoE and, if so, 
whether such restriction was justified 51.  Differently to de Lasteyrie, in N the CJ 
upheld that territoriality and the BATP were, as reasons of public interest, at issue 
in the case; as the ET in question was a form of exercise of Netherlands’ power 
                                                 
51 The additional issue of whether compensation was due for damages emerging from the obligation to 
provide a guarantee is out of this work’s scope. 
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to define the criteria for tax allocation52 and as such allocation could determine 
local taxation of the gains accrued during residence therein, the restriction was 
justified.  However, requiring a guarantee to ensure the fulfilment of the tax 
assessment in The Netherlands on a subsequent disposal of the assets exiting 
Dutch tax jurisdiction was not proportionate to the aim of preserving taxing 
powers. Such aim could be attained, nonetheless, through the less burdensome 
and proportionate obligation of filing a tax declaration at the time of exit. 
Proportionality of such an ET regime would also require that it took into account 
any reductions in value of the shareholding. 
5. The  protection  of  the  mobility  (freedom)  of  the  primary 
establishment 
5.1. Company migrations and reorganizations: comparability analysis under 
the FoE 
Migrations of “national” companies 
Under article 49 TFEU, 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a MS in the territory of 
another MS shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on 
the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any MS 
established in the territory of any MS.    
Free establishment thus comprises, expressis verbis, the setting-up of the so-called 
secondary establishment in another MS and prohibits any discrimination, overt or 
covert53, thereon, by the origin state54 as well as by the host state55.  
                                                 
52 See para.41. 
53 See Cases C-152/73 Sotgiu and C-107/94 Asscher. 
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Even though not in such unequivocal terms, the FoE also encompasses the 
freedom to move the primary establishment, ie., the legal seat or the place of central 
management of a company56 57.  Yet, prima facie, primary establishment mobility 
seems not to reach the breadth acknowledged by the Court to secondary 
establishment mobility.  As we see it, it all depends on the perspective from we 
which look at the concrete transfer of the primary establishment58.  Experience 
from past jurisprudence tells us that, when a discrimination or restriction is being 
imposed by the host state based on its national law or administrative practice, it is 
found to infringe the FoE59.  In Überseering a Dutch incorporated company which 
had moved its place of central management to Germany was impeded to exercise 
its legal rights in a court of law because it lacked legal personality recognition in 
Germany, under this country’s company law.  The relevant question addressed by 
the Court was not whether Überseering could retain its Dutch national status if it 
transferred its legal seat or place of central management to Germany, but whether 
Germany could require Überseering to reincorporate under its internal law.  In 
both cases, the Court did not deny the prevalence, in the absence of 
harmonization, of national laws in determining the relevant connecting factor to 
ascribe nationality for corporate bodies.  The difference is that in Überseering, the 
principle of national treatment was at stake: it was all about comparing the legal 
status of a company considered “German” (incorporated and with its legal seat 
therein) with that of a company considered “national” in another MS, but a 
                                                                                                                                        
54 See C-168/01 Bosal, and Marks and Spencer.  
55 See C-1/93 Halliburton, C-330/91 Commerzank. 
56 See, on this subject, Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The four freedoms (2007 2nd Ed. 
OUP 332). 
57 See, for an earlier view, Dennis Weber, (n10) 353. 
58 See O’ Shea, ‘Hungarian Tax Rule Violates EC Treaty Advocate General Says’ (2008) August 4 TNI 
4.  
59 C-208/00 Überseering, C-212/97 Centros. 
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“foreign” company in Germany.  For the author, this was a true case of 
discrimination on the basis of nationality60, and nothing of the sort was seen in 
Daily Mail.  
Notwithstanding, the existence of a minimum scope for the FoE in the origin 
state in the case of the transfer a primary establishment, is undeniable since 
Cartesio61.  In effect, where the host state facilitates the conversion of a company 
migrating from the origin state into a company governed by its own law, the 
imposition of a prior winding-up or liquidation is seen by the CJ as a restriction 
on the FoE only to be acceptable if justified by “overriding requirements in the public 
interest”. Therefore, the origin state cannot hinder the migrating company’s right 
to become a “national” of the host state by suppressing its legal existence and 
forcing it to reincorporate in the latter state.  Such power is retained only when 
the migrant company, while not seeking to be converted into a national company 
of another MS, intends to preserve its status as a national of the origin state.  
Migration of an SE 
The principles laid down in Cartesio can be transposed, a fortiori, to a migrant SE 
situation. This type of company is, by contrast to national companies, a 
“creature” of European Law, whose connecting factor to a jurisdiction of a MS – 
the place of its registered office – cannot be altered through any of the internal 
legislative procedures of the MSs.  The prerogative of an SE to transfer its 
registered office from one MS to another is expressly provided for by the RegSE 
and not by any internal law of the MSs.  Therefore, no MS is entitled to create an 
obstacle to the exit of an SE by requiring its liquidation or winding-up or, in the 
                                                 
60 The CJ refers to a mere restriction (para. 82), but seems to convey the idea of an actual discrimination 
on nationality when it states that “the location of their registered office, central administration or principal place of 
business constitutes the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular MS in the same way as does nationality in 
the case of a natural person” (para. 57). 
61 See Schneeweiss, op cit., p.372. 
S1007 
 
27 
 
 
case of a host state, its reincorporation into a new legal person62, beyond that of 
requiring that the exit (transfer of the registered office) be accompanied by the 
transfer of the head-office63.  With its corporate continuance safeguarded upon 
exit, an SE may, thus, rely on the FoE to oppose any tax barriers that may be 
lifted by the origin or host states.  
Cross‐border reorganizations 
At the outset, this issue seems of little or no significance, as EU companies enjoy 
a harmonized tax regime which largely facilitates cross-border mergers (the 
Merger Directive) by deferring tax on cross-border asset transfers.  Nonetheless, 
one has to bear in mind that even a harmonized tax regime may ensure less 
protection than the fundamental freedoms in cross-border movements. 
Consequently, it becomes important to ascertain whether any restrictive 
conditions laid down in the Merger Directive for tax neutrality are justified and 
proportional to the goal of preserving the origin state’s tax jurisdiction, should 
FoE apply.    
The issue of free establishment in cross-border mergers was addressed in SEVIC 
Systems64, an origin state case.  SEVIC Systems, a German company, sought to 
merge with a Luxembourg company and was deterred from completing the 
operation by a German court on the grounds that only mergers between German 
companies were recognized under German internal law.  In this case, the loss of 
the connecting factor of the company to the German territory and the ensuing 
tax consequences were not at stake, as SEVIC Systems would cease to exist by 
virtue of the merger.  The Court, contrasting mergers among German companies 
                                                 
62 See article 8 RegSE. 
63 See article 7 RegSE. 
64 C-411/03 SEVIC Systems. 
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and cross-border mergers, held that legal non-recognition of the latter amounted 
to a restriction on “particular methods of exercise of the freedom of 
establishment, important for the proper functioning of the internal market”.  The 
Court went on to remark that, although a number of overriding motives in the 
public interest could justify said restriction, the measure in question went beyond 
what was necessary to safeguard such public interest. 
Comparability analysis of mergers and migrations under the FoE.  
In order to determine whether a certain measure with impact on tax is in breach 
of the FoE (or any other of the fundamental freedoms) it does not suffice to 
assess the particular restrictiveness of such a measure.  A pre-condition to 
establish a discrimination or a discriminatory restriction is to define what some 
authors call a “comparison standard to establish whether the two positions (the 
cross-border and the merely internal) are, in fact and legally, comparable” 65and 
others, more synthetically, a “migrant/non-migrant” test66.  Whatever name this 
task assumes, it is always essential to find the correct comparator so as to assess 
national treatment.  Since the paradigm underlying the fundamental freedoms is the 
internal market, the comparator to a potentially restrictive measure in a cross-
border situation is an objectively parallel purely internal situation67. Comparability 
has been characterized in broad terms by the CJ in cases like Saint-Gobain, where 
the parallel between a PE of a non-resident and a resident company was held to 
encompass even benefits which arose to the latter by virtue of a DTC.  
                                                 
65 See Terra/Wattel, op. cit., 727. By adding factual and legal comparability, these two authors seem to 
align with Prof. Michael Lang’s thoughts in his widely discussed article ‘Recent Case Law of the ECJ in 
Direct Taxation: Trends, Tensions, and Contradictions’ (2009) 3 EC Tax Rev. 101, in particular with 
respect to the issue of comparability, where he expresses his disagreement with the CJ’s choice of factual 
comparability in Schumacker, which culminates in the attribution to Mr. Schumacker of allowances 
accessible only to residents of Germany. 
66 See Tom O’Shea, EU Tax Law and Double Tax Conventions, (Avoir Fiscal Limited 2008) 42.   
67 See C-319/02 Maninnen, 39.   
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The choice of the right comparator for the situations under analysis is apparently 
uncontroversial.  In N68 and de Lasteyrie du Saillant69, the Court explicitly said that 
national treatment would only be observed if a non-migrant in the same 
conditions of the migrant suffered the same tax burden70.   Hence, in relation to 
exit taxes on a company migration, it must be ascertained whether a non-migrant 
company in the same conditions would be taxed on its latent gains.  To be 
comparable, both companies should have the same tax liability to income tax in 
the origin state, which is normally the case of resident companies.  However, one 
could hypothesize a scenario where an internal migration from one state to the 
other – eg. in federal states like Germany – would suffer ET in the same way as a 
cross-border one.  In that scenario, it would be difficult to sustain that the 
principle of national treatment was being infringed. But even with such an even-
handed rule, a restriction to free establishment within the EU would still emerge, 
prompting the question of whether the Bosman71 jurisprudence should be applied.  
In turn, the tax treatment of transfers of assets from the head-office to PEs 
situated in another MS should be contrasted with analogous internal transfers. 
For example, the tax consequences of assets forming a PE of a Portuguese 
                                                 
68 See, para.38, where the CJ explicitly states that “the tax declaration (…) is an additional formality 
likely further to hinder the departure of the person concerned, and which is imposed on taxpayers 
continuing to reside in that MS only when they actually dispose of their holdings”. 
69 See para.46. 
70  For the CJ, differences in treatment of minor importance do not qualify as “same or similar 
treatment” (See N, para. 43). Being itself defined in a positive way, as a subjective right of EU persons, 
the FoE does not allow comparability to be framed negatively, as non-discrimination in article 24 (3) of 
the Model, by virtue of which taxation of a PE of a non-resident shall not be more burdensome than 
that of a resident company. As flows from the 2010 Commentary to this article, taxation may be different 
insofar as it is not more burdensome.  The same principle is not admissible under the FoE, where the same 
treatment must be assured. This is particularly noticeable in C-250/95 Futura (para.26) and, of course, in 
N. 
71 See, C-415/93 Bosman, paras. 98 and 99. 
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Group moving into Spain should be compared with the same move within 
Portuguese territory. Having established the comparator, we should then check if 
the cross-border situation is being disadvantaged72. Safe for the possible “federal 
state” issue mentioned earlier, no tax jurisdiction is lost in a purely internal 
transfer to a PE, and, thus, the outward transfer would be worse-off than its 
internal comparable.  In both cases analyzed, a discriminatory restriction for 
cross-border EU movements clearly arises, thus contravening article 49 TFEU, 
absent a possible justification.  This migrant/non-migrant distinction was 
particularly notorious in origin state cases, like Keller Holding 73 , Cadbury 
Schweppes74or Rewe75. 
With cross-border reorganizations, though, comparability will not achieve the 
same results.  As they involve changes in ownership – that is, income realization -, 
internal transfers will, as a rule, be taxed in the same way as their cross-border 
equals.  Therefore, if there had been no tax harmonization at this level, a MS with 
no internal neutrality regime for reorganizations could tax gains emerging from 
cross-border operations 76 .  Nonetheless, even the harmonized regime of the 
Merger Directive, may be restrictive in a way we see as potentially discriminatory.  
Indeed, it may be argued that the requirement set out in article 4 (1) (b) of the 
Merger Directive, ie., the need to effectively connect the transferred assets and 
liabilities in a reorganization to a PE of the receiving company in the origin state, 
infringes the FoE.  Two companies may merge in the origin state and the 
                                                 
72 On the particular issue of discrimination of PE cross-border movements, see Georg Kofler, Servaas 
Van Thiel, ‘The “Authorized OECD Approach” and EU Tax’ (2011) August ET 327 
73 C-471/04. 
74 C-196/04 
75 C-347/04. 
76 However, this restriction may be so burdensome that the very core of the right of establishment may 
be at stake.  In that case, despite the inexistence of overt or covert discrimination,  the sheer gravity of the 
restriction could, again, justify a Bosman-like approach. 
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receiving company will not be burdened with the need to preserve a fixed 
installation to which the assets of the transferring company remain attached to. 
Those assets may be physically transferred to the premises of the receiving 
company and tax neutrality will endure.  The same cannot be said in relation to a 
cross-border merger when, for instance, the receiving company intends to 
dismantle a production plant in the origin state and move it to  the host state.  
Unlike in a domestic merger, the PE tax neutrality requirement may well end up 
having a negative impact on operational decisions in a cross-border merger.   
5.2. The  Commission’s  position  on  corporate  ET:  a  first  step  in  the  right 
direction  
The central problem in the current debate is whether exit taxes like those in force 
in Portugal, Germany or Norway restrict free establishment in a way which, 
unless justified by imperative reasons of public interest, infringes article 49 
TFEU.  This outcome has already been acknowledged by both the Council77 and 
the Commission78 in two Communications issued in the aftermath of de Lasteyrie 
du Saillant and N.  In its Communication, the Commission goes more in-depth 
into the subject, by reflecting on the problems and distortions that may be caused 
by ET – such as mismatches in the tax bases of the relevant assets in the origin 
and host states and the need for administrative cooperation – as well as by 
drawing important conclusions from the de Lasteyrie judgment in the domain of 
company ET.  Categorically, the Commission acknowledges that: 
It follows from de Lasteyrie that taxpayers who exercise their right to freedom of 
establishment by moving to another MS may not be subject to an earlier or higher tax charge 
than taxpayers who remain in one and the same MS. If a MS allows tax deferral for transfers of 
                                                 
77 Council Resolution on coordinating ET, 2911th Economic and Financial Affairs, of 2 December 2008. 
78 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: ET and the need for co-ordination 
of MSs’ tax policies, COM(2006) 825 final, 19 December 2006 
S1007 
 
32 
 
 
assets between locations of a company resident in that MS, then any immediate taxation in 
respect of a transfer of assets to another MS is likely to be contrary to the EC Treaty freedoms.  
The Commission goes on to define the scope of the cross-border movements 
that would be exposed to those restrictions on the FoE. Curiously, it begins by 
remarking that, following the transfer of an SE’s registered office, only assets 
which did not remain connected to a PE in the origin state would require 
protection under the FoE, as the 2005 amendments to the Merger Directive 
already ensured a tax deferral on gains and losses relating to assets so connected.  
Furthermore, the Commission identifies another type of situation worthy of 
protection under the FoE:  
However, assets and liabilities which are transferred by a company's head office to its PE 
situated in another MS are, under the current tax rules of most MSs, considered as ‘alienated’ 
and gains accrued while the assets were effectively connected with the company resident in their 
territory are usually taxed immediately upon transfer of the assets.   
In regard to either situation, the Commission holds, without hesitation, that the de 
Lasteyrie principles should apply to companies79.  This implies that it recognizes 
the existence of a discriminatory restriction, but also that it accepts that origin 
state jurisdiction within the period in which the gains (and also losses) have 
accrued may justify a tax claim, insofar as the respective exercise does not go 
beyond what is necessary to fulfil such claim.   
                                                 
79 In a pre-Cartesio article, Öttmar Thomes sustains that even in the case where the host state would 
recognize an SE intending to transfer its registered office to its territory, “the state of original incorporation 
would not be prohibited from applying liquidation treatment to the SE in the absence of its compliance with articles 7 and 
64 of the SE Statute”, ie. in the event the transfer would not encompass a concomitant transfer of the 
head-office (‘EC Law Aspects of the Transfer of Seat of an SE’ [2004] ET 22).  We do not aim to 
analyse this exception, but the most likely hypothesis of a company transferring its head office along 
with the registered office. The Commission’s reasoning also seems to be premised on this most likely 
event. 
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Yet, the Commission fails to address two issues, which, for the author, should be 
central in this debate.  First, it remains silent on its position regarding companies 
which are not SEs or SCEs, namely on whether origin states should apply, in 
migrations of “national” companies, the (i) the solution adopted in the Merger 
Directive for SEs, ie., a PE-connection requirement for the assets transferred and 
(ii) the solution described above – that is, an ET deferral - for assets that fail to 
keep such connection. This omission is understandable, if we take into account 
that, by the time the Communication was issued, Cartesio had just been referred 
for a preliminary ruling and, thus, the Commission had not been provided with a 
clearer picture on the framework for national companies’ emigration within the 
EU. Second, the Commission appears to see no problem in the PE-connection 
requirement laid down in the Merger Directive for tax deferral of the underlying 
gains on the assets of an SE, vis-à-vis the FoE.  It views it as a warranty for tax 
neutrality and not as an onerous condition on the migrant SE, which cannot 
choose to move its assets to another jurisdiction and be taxed according to the 
rules therein and thus avoid being levied on unrealized gains in the origin state, 
even if it is recognized that the latter state may keep its claim to tax the gains 
accrued during the period the assets concerned remained in its territory.    
We submit that in most or at least in some cases the freedom offered by article 49 
TFEU to a migrant SE is wider than that which is provided by the Merger 
Directive80.  That is because, presently, taxation of the local assets of a resident 
company and of a PE of a non-resident in the origin state tends to be exactly the 
same81 .  A simple example may illustrate the paradox of the PE-connection 
                                                 
80  While it is true that such requirement is enshrined in a binding legal act of the EU – a Directive – it is 
equally true that Directives have to comply with the fundamental freedoms (an example of a Directive 
infringing its formal boundaries can be found in the landmark Tobacco Advertising Case C-376/98).  
81   That is why the origin state would never find a justification to tax a migrant company on potential 
gains accrued on its domestic assets if those assets remained connected to a local PE. Nothing relevant 
would happen from a tax point of view, as no material loss of tax jurisdiction would emerge. ET would, 
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requirement.  An SE wishing to transfer its registered office from State A to State 
B, intends, as well, to relocate all its resources, which include registered 
trademarks, industrial property, a marketing infrastructure, back-office activities, 
and the respective human and material resources (computers, furniture, etc.).  
This relocation serves operational purposes, but the SE also pursues a higher 
level of tax efficiency by taking advantage of special regimes for IP companies in 
the host state.  Under the Merger Directive, the PE-connection requirement 
[article 10b (1) (b)] will not be met, and the consequent liability to tax in the 
origin state may deter the SE from moving abroad. However, if it may avail itself 
of the de Lasteyrie jurisprudence – a hypothesis not yet confirmed by the CJ - the 
SE will be able to defer ET, albeit with a possible array of administrative 
obligations imposed by the origin state to ensure its share of the accrued gain in 
the eventual disposal of the transferred assets. As a result, it will be able to 
benefit, for instance, from tax incentives applicable to income from IP licensing 
activities in the origin state, thus improving its overall efficiency and 
competitiveness. 
In practice, a migration of an SE where all the assets located in the origin state 
remain attached to a local PE, is rather a formal cross-border movement than a 
new economic endeavour of the type that inspired FoE. Moreover, as the legal 
possibility to transfer the registered office of an SE had already been foreseen in 
the RegSE – that is, the Daily Mail type of problem never did arise -, the 
application of the FoE as per de Lasteyrie, in the absence of the Merger Directive, 
would always provide, as a minimum, the deferral of tax ensured by the PE-
connection requirement.  Therefore, the introduction in 2005 of the SE migration 
regime, looks now more like a strategic move by the Council to institute a new 
archetype for ET, by imposing an illusory limitation on the tax jurisdiction at 
                                                                                                                                        
in that case, amount to an act of pure tax violence.  Unlike Luca Cerioni (op. cit. p. 641), and as 
explained, we do not find relevant to ensure exit relief to what this author calls “domestic converting 
companies” when all of those companies’ assets remain effectively connected to a PE at origin. 
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origin, thus avoiding having to face the main issue of how to really safeguard the 
FoE from ET on a cross-transfer of assets to another PE or to the head-office of 
the same company. 
The scope of the Merger Directive in relation to SEs is, thus, very narrow and 
perhaps one of the reasons behind their scarce use82.  However, at the level of the 
SE’s shareholders, the Merger Directive clearly removes the second-level ET 
restriction, that is, the taxation of the migrant company’s shareholders on the 
latent gains. In this domain, the Directive goes beyond De Lasteyrie and N, by 
stating that the migration shall not, by itself, generate ET on their shareholdings’ 
potential gains (article 10b), and by, apparently, not giving room for the origin 
state to impose any formal requirements thereto, found to be proportional in N83. 
5.3. The limits of the “Balanced Allocation of Taxing Powers” as justification 
for ET 
It is a settled principle of EU Law that restrictions on any of the four freedoms, 
in order to be lawful, should be justified by imperative requirements in the general 
interest 84 . This rule of reason was firstly enunciated in Cassis de Dijon85  and then 
refined in the landmark Gebhard case, establishing a hermeneutical methodology 
that has been used by the CJ ever since. 
In all domestic ET regimes we have come across, taxation was not specifically 
targeted at strictly abusive situations, as opposed to other forms of taxation on 
                                                 
82  Up until 1 August 2011, only 871 SEs had been established (Source: http://ecdb.worker-
participation.eu/). 
83 See para.49. 
84 See C-55/94, para.37. 
85 C-120/78. 
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unrealized income or gains86. Conversely, they enact general rules applicable to 
roughly all relevant limitations on or losses of tax jurisdiction in relation to 
unrealized gains on assets transferred outwards but not alienated.  That is why in 
De Lasteyrie abuse as a justification was categorically dismissed87, and also because 
the French rules at issue foresaw that a person already domiciled abroad who sold 
at a gain a shareholding within five years after emigration, would pay capital gains 
tax in France, clearly evidencing that the purpose of the law was to secure the 
French “slice” of the gains “pie”.  
We also do not see the use, as the debate now stands, in expanding much on 
other justifications for the restrictions posed by ET, not found to be pertinent by 
the CJ either in De Lasteyrie or in N. Some authors88 have thoroughly examined 
the relevance of other justifications like fiscal coherence89 or the prevention of double use 
of losses.90, and inferred that the two should be dismissed outright.  In relation to 
the first one, no direct link can be found in ET between the tax on underlying 
gains and any deductions or allowances provided by the State91; as to the second, 
a double use of losses would be merely hypothetical and could only happen if the 
host state allowed the immigrant company to depreciate the assets entering its tax 
jurisdiction via migration at a value higher than their fiscal value in the origin 
state. The origin state could then argue that, in a certain way, ET neutralizes the 
advantage that the migrant company could derive from a step-up in the 
                                                 
86 Such as CFC regimes, judged in Cadbury-Schweppes and C-201/05 CFC and Dividend Group Litigation. 
87 Para.50. 
88 See Seitz, 60 et seq. and Terra/Wattel, (n65) 746 et seq.   
89 See C-204/90 Bachmann. Führich (n10) 12, and also Terra/Wattel (n65) 781, admit that ET may be 
legitimized by a coherence argument without, however, sustaining straightforwardly that it is sufficient 
justification. 
90 See Marks and Spencer, para.43. 
91 See, inter alia, C-287/10 Tankreederei (para.24) and C-233/09 Dijkman (para.55).  
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depreciable value of the transferred assets92. This is totally different from the 
relevant facts, for instance, in Marks&Spencer and Oy AA 93 , which dealt, 
respectively, with the use of the same losses in two jurisdictions and the transfer 
of profits to take advantage of the losses generated in a MS different from the 
one where the profits arose.  Here, the issue is the double advantage of the same 
tax situation (use of losses) and the neutralization in the origin state of losses 
already realized via their offset with losses recorded in another state .  In the ET 
situation, the tax advantage is merely hypothetical, the host state may not allow 
depreciation on the value on which the ET is computed in the origin state, and 
the asset depreciation in the latter state may have been offset by profits generated 
and taxed therein prior to the exit, in which case the origin state does not suffer 
any tax base erosion.  In short, this situation clearly does not fit into the prevention 
of double use of losses justification. 
As mentioned earlier, in relation to justifications the CJ has accepted that  
MSs retain the power to define, by treaty or unilaterally the criteria for allocating their powers 
of taxation, particularly with a view to eliminating double taxation”94 and also that, “ (...) in 
accordance with that principle of fiscal territoriality, connected with a temporal component, 
namely residence within the territory during the period in which the taxable profit arises, that 
the national provisions in question provide for the charging of tax on increases in value (...)95,  
in order to conclude 
it follows, first, that the measure at issue in the main proceedings pursues an objective in the 
public interest (...).     
                                                 
92 Seitz explains that this justification is upheld by the German Tax Administration (op. cit., p. 62).  
93 C-231/05.   
94 See N, para.44. 
95 Idem, para.45. 
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Thus, for the CJ, fiscal territoriality and the need to preserve the BATP – which the 
CJ appears to consider as two sides of one single justification96 - may justify ET. 
Clearly, the allocation of taxing powers among states, which is put in place through 
DTCs or, in the EU context, through the income taxes Directives, is a corollary 
of those states’ underlying territorial sovereignty and expresses an idea of 
coordination which is the main focus of the following analysis.   As a justification 
for restrictions to the FoE, the BATP has been, in recent years, called upon by 
the CJ in a growing number of cases, relating to diverse income tax issues.  It has, 
specifically, been tolerated as a motive to counter (i) the transfer of profits in the 
form of unusual or gratuitous advantages between related entities 97 , (ii) the 
transfer of profits to or the deduction of losses in one state that had been 
generated in another state, within the same Group scheme98, or (iii) the deduction 
of losses of a foreign PE by the head-office99.  Unlike in N, in this group of cases 
the BATP argument was always applied in conjunction with anti abuse–type 
justifications, namely the prevention of tax avoidance and or the prevention of the double 
use of losses.  This difference makes perfect sense, in view of the aforesaid character 
of most ET regimes in the EU and, in particular, of those examined in N and de 
Lasteyrie100.  As previously noted, they aspire to create a general regime for all exit 
situations and, thus are specifically not targeted at abuse or distortions. 
Furthermore, and going back to the discussion of the first chapters of this work, 
it should be stressed that the three aforementioned cases revolved around the tax 
treatment of effectively realized profits or losses and the reflection of the ensuing 
increased or diminished ability-to-pay in the location found convenient, in 
                                                 
96 Terra/ Wattel (n65) 765 clearly underline the affinity between the two arguments. 
97 C-311/08 SGI.   
98  See Oy AA, Marks and Spencer. 
99 C-414/06 Lidl Belgium. 
100 It should be reminded that in De Lasteyrie the CJ did not address BATP as a justification to ET 
because the issue was not in dispute (para.68).  
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detriment of the state with which they were territorially linked (eg. in SGI and Oy 
AA), or the double consideration of a diminished ability-to-pay within a cross-
border group of companies (Marks and Spencer). With ET not only is a mere 
potential ability-to-pay at stake, but also the most likely risk thereof is that of a 
double taxation and not the opposite.  Hence, in the author’s view, the restriction 
to the FoE posed by ET is, from a BATP standpoint, seemingly less justifiable 
than those spotted in the cases just mentioned.  
Yet, in X Holding101, the BATP was singled out as the only justification susceptible 
of allowing the MSs to maintain their internal tax grouping schemes eligible solely 
for resident companies.   Once more, the CJ adequately identified “the courses of 
action that are capable of jeopardising the right of the member states to exercise 
their taxing powers”102, by stating that  
the possibility of including a non-resident subsidiary in the single tax entity would be 
tantamount to granting the parent company the freedom to choose the tax scheme applicable 
to the losses of that subsidiary and the place where those losses are taken into account.103 
The main idea from this line of thinking is that the inclusion of a non-resident 
subsidiary would deprive the state granting the group relief from exercising its 
taxing powers in relation to the resident company’s profits (one or more 
companies within the group) by allowing other foreign companies’ losses – over 
which no control is exercised by the origin state – to offset those profits.  
In our view, a ban on cross-border group taxation on the basis of the BATP 
coexists much better with the FoE than imposing ET on companies with no 
effective deferral possibilities.  Such ban is targeted at cross-border transfers of 
losses which have the capability of effectively and definitively neutralizing the origin 
                                                 
101 C-338/08.   
102 See Tom O’Shea, EU Tax Law (…) 139. 
103 See para.31. 
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state’s104 power to tax in relation to realized local profits, whereas in ET the issue 
of when and how taxing powers are exercised  - ie. the “exit” - arises prior the real 
allocation problem, ie. the imputation of the part of the gains/losses thereof 
(which are only potential upon exit) to the origin and host states prompted by the 
eventual disposal of the migrating assets.  The CJ appears to have made this 
distinction in N105 , by alluding to the charging of tax on disposal, and to a 
suspension of the right to tax of the Netherlands until that moment, which is the 
right taxing point also as per article 13(5) of the OECDMC.  We submit, 
therefore, that ET regimes imposed upfront with no possibility of effective 
deferral are not worthy of being justified, unless they are only aimed at targeting 
abusive situations106.   
It is, thus, fair to ask whether the solution in N, if switched to a corporate 
scenario, should not converge with the outcome of Cadbury-Schweppes107 and Test 
Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation, where, despite very different 
backgrounds, the decisive issue was the EU conformity of a tax on unrealized 
profits (a mere imputation) in the country of residence of a company which had 
exercised its right of secondary establishment by setting up a subsidiary in 
another EU state108.  From an overall and substantive analysis, both situations can 
                                                 
104 In this context, and for the sake of this analysis, the origin state is the state which group taxation 
scheme’s application is at issue.  
105 See para.46. 
106 Seitz (op. cit., p. 72) also holds that conformity with EU Law of the German ET regime will only be 
achieved through a regulation which ensures the profit attribution (to a German PE) only after disposal 
of the migrating assets. 
107 Case C-201/05. 
108 Terra/Wattel emphasize that the BATP was also involved as a justification to prevent “the type of 
conduct (…) such as to undermine the right of the Member States to exercise their tax jurisdiction in 
relation to the activities carried out in their territory” (op. cit., p.766)   
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indeed be compared109.  By way of example, Group A sets up in its state of 
residence (A) company B to develop the market of state B and sell there through 
independent agents while, at the same time, incorporates company C in state C 
where it intends to develop a genuine new business.  Under Cadbury-Schweppes, A 
would not be allowed to tax the undistributed profits generated by C even if the 
income tax rate in state C was substantially lower than that of state A.  However, 
if company B migrates to state B, state A may, if the principles stated in N are 
enforced, tax any hidden reserves up to the moment of migration.  It is beyond 
dispute that B’s link to A’s territory until the migration is stronger than C’s, as it 
was domiciled therein. This is coherent with EU states’ competence in direct 
taxation issues, including that of defining the tax connecting factors.  
Notwithstanding, Cadbury-Schweppes dealt with profits that, though undistributed, 
had been fully realized, and would only be partially allocated to the parent’s state by 
way of imputation and credit.  
The argument of equality between migrant and non-migrant companies, in terms 
of tax payable until migration, to justify deferred ET – we have already dismissed 
upfront ET as an FoE-abiding unilateral measure – is not very convincing when 
we observe that the court has ruled out CFC regimes that encompassed genuine 
economic activities. Indeed, in the above case, a similar situation (that of B and 
C) could have a different treatment, as C would be taxable as per the rules and 
rates of C, whereas B would always see its effective and potential profitability 
taxed in A. In addition, there are other arguments that are normally seen as clearly 
supportive of the case for ET, which, in our opinion, should not be taken as 
such.  First, as already enunciated, the argument of ET as a compensation for the 
benefits provided by the origin state may prove to be a fallacy110: 
                                                 
109 See reference to Norwegian CFC ET regime, p. 18 supra. 
110 For Seitz, this appears to be a decisive argument (op. cit., p. 72). 
S1007 
 
42 
 
 
i. Any tax deductions or use of public goods may have been compensated by 
taxes paid at origin within the life of a company prior to migration; ie., benefits 
and taxation may be temporally matched. A sign of such compensation may be 
the inexistence of carry-forward losses at the time of migration; 
ii. It is likely that the bulk of the potential gains on exit derive from a discounted 
cash-flows valuation, relating to cash-flows not only future, but also expected to be 
sourced outside the origin state. 
Moreover, as recognized by authors like Schön, the residence bond is, nowadays 
“much more precarious when it comes to taxpayers” 111. In his words,  
the corporate income tax on the company’s profits works as a “source tax” on the operating 
profit before it is paid out as a dividend to the shareholders or the parent company in another 
country. This leads to the result that taxation with respect to the location of a corporate 
headquarters or the country of incorporation is a strange mixture of source and residence 
taxation at the same time. 
This conclusion is perfectly consistent with the current international residence 
criteria for companies and individuals.  While, in relation to the latter, notions like 
the “central of vital interests” tend to be effective tie-breakers, as regards the 
former, ascribing residence based on the place of effective management is increasingly 
difficult, as is evidenced by the international lack of consensus on the respective 
definition112.  Therefore, in a corporate setting, ET may tend to have much more to 
do with avoiding a possible loss of tax revenue – not an accepted justification for a 
restriction 113  -  than with the genuine exercise of territoriality as a principled 
attribution of the state (based on the ability-to-pay and benefit axioms). A symptom of 
that pragmatic approach is the circumstance that none of the ET regimes analysed 
                                                 
111 Op. Cit., p. 69. 
112 Cfr. Commentary on article 4 OECMC. 
113 See, inter alia,  C-35/98 Verkooijen. 
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works on a previous assessment of the contribution of the respective jurisdiction to 
the pursued hidden reserves.   
The above arguments, taken together with the idea affirmed by the CJ, in Cadbury-
Schweppes, that establishment can also be sought for tax reasons, as long as it 
corresponds to a genuine economic activity, raise important doubts on the 
susceptibility of ET being justifiable, let alone on the proportionality of many of 
the domestic regimes in force in the EU, a matter discussed in the next chapter. 
6. Conclusion.  Attempting  to  anticipate  corporate  ET  from  the  CJ’s 
standpoint. 
The CJ will soon decide whether some states of the EU may maintain their ET regimes 
unchanged.  Presently, four cases are pending in the CJ against particular groups of 
States that have ET legislation found by the Commission to be in breach of the Court’s 
dicta in N and de Lasteyrie and also in the aforementioned Comission’s Communication: 
Portugal114, The Netherlands115 and Spain116.  Another case, brought against the Dutch 
Tax Authorities117, is also pending on the CJ, where, in addition to the issue of the 
overall lawfulness of exit tax, a decision on whether the BATP may justify an exit tax 
without any possibility of deferral and consideration for post-exit asset devaluations has 
been requested.  The previous analysis may help us anticipate some of the solutions the 
CJ could adopt or, at least, identify the fundamental discussion topics. 
                                                 
114 Case C-38/10 Commission v. Portugal. 
115 Case C-301/11 Commission v. Netherlands. 
116 Case C-269/09 Commission v. Spain. 
117 Case C- 371/10 National Grid Indus. 
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Despite the serious doubts expressed in the previous paragraph about whether ET can 
really be justified in an EU setting, namely on the basis of BATP, we have to concede 
that company migration may be a domain considerably prone to abuse and also that 
some form of compensation of benefits provided by the origin state - or better put, a 
reward for the contribution of the origin state to the profitability of the migrant 
company up to exit - should be put in place.  This would not amount to accepting a 
restriction without justification118  but rather recognizing that such compensation is 
justified as a way to uphold the legitimate right of a state to quell tax base erosion 
schemes.  That is to say, prevention of tax abuse as a justification legitimizes not only 
restrictions to the FoE to avert tax avoidance measures but also restrictions intended to 
avoid disruptions to ‘balanced and consistent interjurisdictional results’119.  It is then 
highly likely that the Court’s decision on the pending cases will mainly focus on the 
proportionality of the measures at issue to attain their legitimate purpose. Such 
proportionality should be assessed in two different ways: through (i) quantification, in 
terms of duration and taxable amount, of the extent of the origin state’s taxing rights, so 
that the above consistency and compensation is achieved, and (ii) definition of the 
terms under which it will be considered that the restrictions to the FoE secure such 
compensation will not go beyond what is necessary (eg. ancillary obligations such as tax 
returns, guarantees). 
In relation to compensation of the origin state, a first possible solution would be the 
Court disagreeing with the Commission and declaring that the Merger Directive SE 
regime which establishes potential gains deferral only for assets that remain connected 
to a PE in the origin state attains its full compensation and prevents abuse. For the 
reasons already pointed out and considering the evident lack of consistency with the 
corollaries of both N and de Lasteyrie, this solution does not seem likely.   It is, 
therefore, expectable that the CJ will uphold the right for a deferral of gains upon exit 
                                                 
118 See below section 5.3. on the relevance of the BATP in exit situations as a single justification 
119 See Terra/Wattel (n65) 768. 
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both in corporate migrations and in cross-border asset transfers. Many other 
possibilities could be considered, but we could attempt to anticipate a few guidelines 
which, based on the principles and jurisprudence herein, may be hinted by the Court in 
the coming decisions: 
(i) Only a full and complete deferral of potential gains until disposal of the relevant 
assets, and not just a limited relief mechanism under which ET will be spread 
over four or five years (as in foreseen in the German regime), even if no disposal 
takes place, will be proportionate and, thus compatible with the FoE, while 
preserving the origin state’s tax claim. For the author, this may be the dividing 
line between a legitimate anti base-erosion restriction and one strictly oriented to 
the protection of the revenue.  
(ii) As in the Norwegian regime, prevention of abuse may no longer be justifiable 
after a relevant number of years have passed from exit, in relation to assets 
unsold.  After more than five years or so, it may become evident that the exit 
was not abusive and also that it becomes increasingly difficult to ascertain the 
origin state’s contribution to any gains which may be realized thereafter on those 
assets. Therefore, to be proportional and balanced, ET regimes should, besides 
taking account of asset devaluations120, foresee phasing out schemes for the exit 
claim, thus reflecting the decreased benefit provided by the origin state. 
(iii) One important discussion point may be a possible compensation of the loss of 
the exit tax claim by the origin state, whenever the migration seeks simply to re-
allocate the assets to a jurisdiction where the rents or royalties thereof are 
favourably taxed.  Such importance lies in the fact that the potential value of most 
assets may be realized either through sale or through concession of their use, ie., 
licensing and leasing, and certain states may want to tax the part of the post-exit 
royalties or rents deriving from the value accrued in the origin state. In these or 
                                                 
120 See N, para.54. 
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in future cases, the CJ may consider that, also within a certain period, the origin 
state is, eg., allowed to claim the difference between the tax that would be 
charged on a rent on the migrating assets, had the exit not occurred, and tax 
effectively charged on the rent by the host state.  This would place all other exit 
situations on an equal footing to that of a cross-border transfer of assets to a PE 
located in a state which DTC with the origin state applies the ordinary credit 
method. 
Finally, in relation to reporting obligations and other ancillary duties which may be 
deemed necessary to ensure the origin state’s taxing rights we do not see any reason 
why the Court would deviate from the guideline set forth in para.50 of N, namely the 
acceptance of an initial obligation to file a tax declaration computing the potential 
gain on the assets transferred and the maintenance of documentary evidence thereon 
while such gain remains taxable in the origin state. 
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